Chapter 1: The Evolutionary Perspective on Cognition

Language has a profound impact on how we perceive the world, allowing us to go beyond the limitations imposed by our evolutionary history. A significant critique of evolutionary epistemology posits that evolution does not favor the development of sensory organs or cognitive abilities that accurately represent the world in its entirety. Instead, it selects for perceptual and cognitive strategies that enhance an organism's ability to interact effectively with crucial environmental features.

Donald Hoffman, a cognitive science professor at UC-Irvine, likens our perception of reality to the desktop interface on a computer. Just as the desktop simplifies interaction with complex underlying systems, our perceptions serve as useful tools for navigating our environment. While the desktop provides a functional view, it conceals intricate realities that are unnecessary for survival. Evolution has equipped us with perceptions that foster adaptive behaviors, often obscuring the broader aspects of reality that we do not need to grasp fully. If we were to devote all our attention to understanding this complexity, we might fall prey to dangers—like a tiger lurking nearby.

However, I find value in this perspective when discussing biological evolution, with two clarifications: (1) when we reference "truth," we generally mean the truth of statements rather than mere sensations (since sensations themselves lack truth value); and (2) unlike the genes that shape our sensory apparatus, statements can be evaluated according to various selection criteria.

This leads us to envision cultures where ideas are chosen based on their potential to enhance economic productivity, evoke spiritual experiences, or even explore the universe's deeper structures beyond our innate intuitions.

Language not only facilitates reflection on how evolution has influenced our perceptions but also allows us to surpass these limitations. For beings lacking symbolic thought, the bounds of their understanding define their world. They cannot differentiate between phenomena and noumena or between theory and practice.

In contrast, language enables us to explore a vast array of conceptual realms. Non-linguistic animals do not have the luxury of choosing among different representations of their world. Our capacity for language presents us with the challenge of selecting from myriad ways to conceptualize our surroundings. Notably, the fitness of an idea does not inherently determine its truth. This observation aligns with Hoffman’s critique and extends to concepts that resonate aesthetically or morally, separate from an objective representation of reality.

Yet, can we ever attain true independence from our fitness criteria? How can we arrive at any representation or trust it without such criteria? While I can envision human and alien scientists converging on shared aspects of physical reality, this requires imagining those aliens possessing sufficient similarities to us.

Ultimately, defining "truth" remains elusive. Although we humans possess the gift of symbolic thought, we are also encumbered by worldly concerns. Like the muse in Wallace Stevens’ poetry, we create narratives that transcend our sensory limitations and evolutionary instincts. However, we must also remain cautious of interpretations that stray too far from our tangible experiences. This isn't a dismissal of the evolutionary framework of knowledge; rather, it affirms that the truths we can grasp will invariably reflect their humble origins.